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Extended drought conditions have pushed western water reservoir shortage generally and Great Salt Lake specifically into near-crisis levels--levels at which one or two normal-to-wet seasons cannot solve, given the overall trajectory of predictable trends. The consequences of these trends are beyond fear-mongering as they impact all of Western society.
I'm assuming people are generally aware that there is a water crisis in the west. I'm assuming that people respond with trust to measured data. When I use measured data (historical USGS lake elevations, river flows, temperatures), I am making no assumptions about what is the root cause of climate change. I believe in non-politicized science. I'm assuming that people respond favorably to solution-oriented discussions once there is a common realization of a common problem.
Conservation today. Plan (something liek) drill many deep saline wells immediately to slow then stop the downward GSL elevation inertia (3-5 years). Begin immediately to prepare for a solution that will last for generations, ensuring a water abundance economy that will invite growth and prosperity beyond health and well-being.
In this plan, I use the words "seawater" and "pipes" in the same sentence. In the recent past, such thoughts were indeed worthy of severe mocking. In this solutions-oriented proposal I attempt to make the reader aware of emerging technologies that render the proposal not only financially possible, but lucrative to investment--given the integrated mineral harvesting and water sales revenue that funds program capacity expansion.
The BYU study (Sowby, Williams, South 2023) is properly cited in the Advocacy Document. Their analysis assumed grid electricity pricing for pumping and desalination; not purpose-built point-of-use (POU) reactors. Under grid pricing assumptions, any seawater pipeline is indeed impractical. The GSR's financial model is fundamentally different: the reactor capital is part of the system CapEx, and the marginal energy cost is zero once built. The BYU study also used an earlier, less optimized route. We welcome scrutiny of our updated numbers.
Revenue is in the OpEx column from brine mineral harvesting (Li, Mg, I) and from valuable elements harvested from the power sources themselves (Kr, Xe, tritium). Future expansions of the Great Salt River will come from investments against annual self-generated revenues.
Good question. The energy analysis is thorough and convincing of the monumental task of lifting that much water to Utah's elevation. Of course it is ridiculous to consider half a billion dollars in annual energy costs. This is the main question.
Is it also the definitive 'end-of-story'?
The Great Salt River premise, however, is based on one primary game-changing factor that the authors were not aware of: the placement of thorium powered molten salt reactor power plants dedicated at each of the pumping stations. This means:
No per-kWhr charges for power (nominal maintenance, and low spent fuel disposal costs). We zero out the $0.5B/yr in power costs by purchasing the power capability up-front as a dedicated one-time-expense line item in our capital purchase. This is paradigm-shifting, cheap, point-of-use power.
The Th-MSR's operate at very high temperature, making the direct thermal conversion to motive power extremely efficient using primary heat to drive supercritical CO2 turbine pumps. (The BYU study properly assumed carbon-to-electricity with remote power transmission and electrical-to-motive conversion.)
Left-over heat energy (after the top-end temperature is dropped by the pumping action) is efficiently used for desalinating the water en route to using every drop and every included mineral as a gift from the sea.
The BYU study properly describes the need to focus on short term solutions, due to the urgency of the problem. The Great Salt River is proposed here not as a short term solution, but as the means of providing a secure water future to our great-great grandkids and theirs, once the bridging (interim) solutions are recognized for their true limitations.
Yes, there were insurmountable technical problems with the "pumping seawater" idea, just three years ago. But the technical solutions exist today that behoove us to examine this opportunity again with a fresh perspective.
"Raising a society's imaginative baseline . . is about rediscovering and redeploying the germ of imaginative courage that, in many cases, has been buried . . . . It is about widening and deepening the imaginative pool and listening to new voices."
--Albert Read, The Imaginative Muscle (2023)
We are all in the same boat, here in the West. That is to say that there is no water "under" any of us. We are all high and dry, as the saying goes. The Great Basin, The CO, Rio Grande are all already in structural failure, unable to provide the water needed in their served communities or stakeholders. And the Mighty Columbia is just beginning to show exactly the same symptoms.
Per discussions with the former DNR water attorney, there is NO unclaimed water available other than seawater. Each of these rivers is fully allocated, and none can support the huge diversion needed to supply the GSL, the growing Wasatch front, the mountain ski resorts, or the growth in Washington County. We are simply trying to divide a shrinking water resource for a rapidly growing set of communities.
Yes, it is likely that we will need to drill in the near-term, simply because of the time needed to bring the Great Salt River into production. Drilling is faster (potentially, in the absence of litigation over ownership and cross-contamination and environmental impact), at least technically. But it is fraught with the uncertainty of an unknown and finite resource.
Geologists can identify high probability drilling sites and target depths. Many hundreds of wells will be needed to make a difference. POU power sources as discussed here will be necessary. But the large political risk is whether there is the commitment in place to shut these wells down and proceed with the long-term plan. As long as the wells are flowing, it is easy to forget the hard times. But ask Tehran what it is like when the aquifers are relied on too much for too long: they dry up and the people must mass-exodus. The deep aquifer solution must be considered only a band-aid to help stop the bleeding until the long term solution is in place to protect the future of our posterity.
It has been said that "No one ever made money desalinating water." The Great Salt River is not just desalinating. It is harvesting valuable minerals from highly concentrated brine. Then the "salt" brine that is left over is utilized in Salt Flats groundwater regeneration ponds instead of being dumped into the ocean. "Waste heat" from the POU power sources will be used to thermally desalinate the water, thus improving the overall system efficiency.
So, we can ask the ski and tourism industries whether our solution to desalination is expensive. We can ask Wyoming if they would be happy to have Utah cease and desist in its Wasatch cloud seeding program so that newly abundant atmospheric moisture can be shared throughout the Uinta Mountains and the Bear River basin.
This is such a delicate topic with huge ramifications. The question itself spawns many other difficult questions, such as the ethics of allowing foreign interests to purchase vast swaths of land so that they can control the adjudicated water rights. Or what is "freedom" in America if a landowner cannot choose what to do with their own land and their rightfully owned water? What value does that land have without its water? Shall we dry up that land and create a dust bowl there, too, kicking the problem 'down the road' where we cannot see it every day? It is still going to be somebody's dust.
Are food prices expected to stay the same when there is less water to produce it or the generational families who ran the farms have become destitute?
Certainly water pricing can drive the more efficient use of water in commercial and residential markets. It's not quite so obvious in the Ag sector, since you have to have the water to stay in business. And letting land go fallow puts lots of people out of business and out of work. Similarly, not all conservation techniques are equally applicable for all crops. Root zone irrigation, for example, does not apply to field crops such as alfalfa, nor to many row crops, as it does apply to orchards.
I don't know how to answer that question, but competent, fair-minded people are working on it, leaving me feeling free to think about long-term ramifications of the new, hot/dry normal.
Engineered water diversions always assumed the ample natural water supply and really didn't account the overall effect on the GSL. The graph here illustrates the effect of diversions increasing and the inflow declining. Over many years, the lake was robust enough to share her waters. But a point was reached where natural resiliency to climactic fluctuations was impacted, and we have seen the negative trends elsewhere.
The comparison is fundamentally flawed because 1983 was a wet year among increasing dry cycles and the beginning of an accelerating momentum in lake volume loss that cannot any longer be cured by a single or two wet seasons. We are talking here about refilling a lake when no dying saline lake worldwide has ever been fully replenished. Owens Lake is not "cured". We must learn from the historical trends and saline lake catastrophes that have preceded us.
The only good news from the failed 80's pumping project was that when a threat was realized, Utah's leaders committed to do something, and that something was implemented quickly. Conversely, how many years have the alarms been sounding over the crashing GSL ecosystem, and we have done little more than cautious hand-wringing.
Water naturally flowing into Owens Lake was diverted to LA municipal water supplies in the middle of the last century, creating no small amount of animosity and a modern water war. Within thirty years, the lake dried up and created a dust bowl affecting local communities of several thousand people. This is certainly a valid warning to us.
Many mitigation strategies were attempted, costing the city of LA $1.5-2B, and millions of dollars in annual maintenance fees. The problems are not solved completely, and the agricultural economy of the area has not recovered. So, yes, there are important lessons to be learned.
It is extremely frustrating to realize that (for example) the Seven States of the Colorado River Compact (+ Mexico) have been struggling with overallocation of that river, and are just now having to deal with Lake Mead and Lake Powell approaching dead pool status. Losers abound. There will be no winners. The only solution to creating a water abundance economy that facilitates both collaboration and growth is with new water. And there is no new water without clean, safe, abundant POU power.
This is the main hypothesis for the Great Salt River. The corollary is that the Great Basin can manage large quantities of brine in a way that the Pacific Ocean cannot: Instead of killing the ocean floor by dumping toxic brine, we create revenue (from minerals) and atmospheric water (from increased Lake area). We create winners not losers. We create many reasons for working together.
These kinds of problems are managed constantly when large infrastructure projects take place. So, people and governments have representatives and systems to manage the changes. Think of power lines, oil and gas pipelines, interstate highways and state roads. Attorneys battle on both sides until agreements are reached. In this case, we have reasons for each state to step up and assist in moving these processes along swiftly, since every state (of the seven + Mexico) but Wyoming is a net consumer of water, and so replenishing the Colorado River is in every state's interest.
Even Wyoming as a net producer will be able to protect its water rights from being re-assigned by federal bureaucrats through this GSR Initiative. And in the process of bringing water to Utah and multiplying the GSL evaporative area, Wyoming will have a negotiating lever to ask Utah to stop its cloud seeding programs.
I'm not a civil engineer who has studied water from the perspective of how water has always been managed. I am a solutions-oriented innovator who recognizes the value of water from a visceral, experiential perspective. My family are historically farmers and ranchers in Utah and Wyoming who keenly watch precipitation patterns and reservoir storage. What I am is, in awe of the great science that has been done and the good intentions that have motivated policy in the face of really difficult if not desperate circumstances.
Yes, I'm a technologist who is aware of what can be done using a systems approach with recent advances, and how a new approach to a giga project doesn't have to be financially devastating.
More importantly than any of this, I am an innovator committed to Win-Win or "no deal." I believe we can cease the bickering, fighting and water thieving and all benefit by working together. It's either that or try to hitchhike onto Elon's next rocket to Mars.
I believe that by sharing this insight as a vision with the water experts and policy makers, we can provide hope where not much previously existed; and opportunities for truly collaborative action where only territorial conflict and certain loss previously dominated.
My personal, deeply held belief leading to breakthrough innovation is, "there MUST be a better way. That's why God made engineers."
My operating mantra is, "Great engineering should be beautiful to behold."
Let me suggest that the Th-fuel supply chain is far, far simpler than its U-based cousin, because the Th (and a seed of U for neutron production) is dissolved in a molten salt... like mixing flour and table salt into hot butter to make a roux. The process for making Th a useful fuel is far, far simpler and cheaper than for U-based fuels. And the disposal for spent fuel is much less complicated and much, much less expensive.
Expensive and complex processes for making U-based fuels safe, such as TRISO ensure very burdensome ongoing operating and disposal expenses. Perhaps that is the real reason why so many big, influential companies are heavily invested in advocating U-based fuels and systems?
Coal is too valuable to burn. Carbon is the feedstock for carbon fiber, graphite, graphene, and advanced composites. Coal at $50-$80/ton as fuel becomes carbon fiber at $30,000-$50,000/ton as advanced fabrication material. The GSR makes use of this material, carbon-fiber-in-graphite (C/C) pipes manufactured from coal-based precursors with amazing properties: ~50% less cost than steel, high strength/wt ratio, UV resistant, no expansion joints needed, 10x longer life, non-corroding in seawater. Coal communities (Utah's coal-economy "Five Counties") become manufacturing hubs for the GSR's pipeline infrastructure.
The high corrosivity of concentrated seawater brines makes it essential to use chemically unreactive pipe materials for the multiple-generations (50-100 yrs) longevity we are pursuing. C/C materials (carbon fiber in a graphite matrix) have been used for decades in aerospace applications.
The densification process used for aerospace C/C is not appropriate to use for C/C in a pipe shape, so we use different techniques that are appropriate; also far, far less expensive and time consuming.
Yes, the folks making aerospace C/C for rocket nose cones and nozzles have to build their material to very tight specifications. There is no room for error within form factor and density margins. That's actually why coal-to-carbon fiber hasn't yet taken off, so-to-speak: there is too much intrisic variability in the coal precursor material (even from the same mine) to result in a tightly designed outcome. They are 'rocket scientists' after all. But with pipes, we don't have to achieve a uniform tight density (there can be a density gradient). We just have to understand the strength attributes of the materials we are working with, then design thickness and wrap strategy accordingly. If real-time defect imaging identifies an anomaly in the digital twin, the fabrication process for pipes makes it okay to accommodate with additional wrapping and processing. But we need to get started developing this in Utah.
The primary relationship is the need to prevent lake contamination by Superfund site hazards as the lake levels approach the site again in proximity. The abandoned (or incomplete) berm-building approach may give some comfort to some people, but an aggressive cleanup should be top priority. The EPA berm requirement is just a white flag indicating that "we don't know what the heck to do!"
But we in Utah can figure this thing out, now that the State is in control. The proposed Sludge Monster destroys the toxic organic materials while rendering heavy metals (As, Hg) inert.
In the long-term perspective, the intercalation approach to Li and Mg harvesting is vastly superior to the traditional USMag operations or even modern DLE techniques because it offers the ability to continuously extract these materials (and associated revenue) from a concentrated seawater brine stream inside the pipe before the salt-containing residual is used for evaporative and restorative West Desert ponds.
The Salton Sea is a genuine win-win for the GSR. Phase I produces ~3 MAf/yr of brine at 65 g/L TDS that flows by gravity ~25 miles from PS-1 to the Salton Sea at elevation -243 ft; no pumping required. This continuous inflow stabilizes a failing ecosystem that is currently collapsing at great risk to public health and economic cost. There is zero ocean brine discharge. The Salton Sea becomes a mineral bank; concentrated brines containing lithium, magnesium, and iodine provide feedstock either for current geothermal or later Phase II mineral extraction operations.
The GSR does not renegotiate tribal rights. It creates the physical and political space to honor them. Congress and the courts have recognized approximately 3.2 MAf/yr of tribal water rights in the Colorado River Basin; roughly 25% of the basin's average annual supply (NARF, May 2025). Yet many tribal communities lack delivery infrastructure. The Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation holds senior, quantified rights but the Central Utah Project's "Ute Indian Units" were never completed. The GSR's Green River spur enables a stepwise reduction in CUP-era transbasin exports, allowing more Duchesne/Uintah water to remain in-basin under Ute governance. Going forward, we must commit to engaging tribal water authorities as genuine partners, not bargaining chips.
The GSR is the optimized engineering implementation of the Adams vision.
See the Adams Framework page for a detailed comparison table. In summary: Pacific coast desal dumps toxic brine into the ocean, gives California construction control, serves only 2 states, and requires complex upstream water releases. The GSR restores the Salton Sea, provides collaborative control, serves all seven states via the Law of the River, and injects freshwater directly at Imperial Dam.
Every acre-foot that Phase I injects into the Colorado River at Imperial Dam is one less acre-foot the Upper Basin must worry about in a compact call. By adding water at the bottom of the system, Phase I effectively relaxes the Lee's Ferry pressure gauge. The overallocation gap drops from ~4.1 MAf/yr to ~1.6 MAf/yr. Utah and Colorado can develop more of their existing compact allocations without triggering curtailment. Phase II extends the benefit directly to Utah, WY, CO via the I-15 corridor, GSL, and the Green River spur.
The worst outcome is arriving at 2036 with a collapsed lake and no plan.
Phase I is ~10-15 years to construction, with operational water delivery within another ~8-10 years of authorization. During the construction window, we must conserve aggressively to buy time. Bridge strategies include water pricing, water markets, consumption caps, QSA conservation credits, and demand management pilots. The GSR is the long-term solution; conservation is the bridge. But the planning and political work must begin now.
This project began in early 2023 during a GSL-themed conversation while driving home from a tour at Idaho National Lab. Concepts were developed through consultation with experts and visionaries, then deeply researched, quantified, and visualized using many simultaenous iterative processes directed by the lead author. Many of these drafts were read and vetted by experts or discussed in person for direct coaching of the author. Draft version 8 was proof-read and line-edited by humans before critical review by three simultaneous advanced AI systems.
Hopefully this work is now in a form useful for collaborative discussions and negotiations leading to feasibility vetting, planning, financial commitment and successful execution.
The authors are deeply indebted to the hydrologists, geologists, climatologists, and ecologists who have amassed carefully researched data and made it publicly available.
This is an unfunded, volunteer initiative. The authors have no financial interest in any technology vendor, water district, or development entity mentioned in this document. The lead author, Ian R. Harvey, Ph.D., is an Adjunct Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering at the University of Utah and principal of Snow Horse Analytical Lab.
The principal author (an inventor with 29 patents) has submitted three patent applications around the Sludge Monster. The author has previously collaborated with Combustion Resources, LLC to demonstrate rapid conversion of carbon fiber in pitch to C/C and understands the physics in order to adapt the approach to pipes.
The intention behind this effort is to create the means by which the People of Utah can realize the financial benefits of harvesting value from USMag while cleaning the place up; and then using those funds to resuscitate GSL.
This might be done by developing a 501c6 organization with the State of Utah (at least) holding equity to oversee the Great Salt River Initiative and stimulate active development in the technologies (power, wells, pipes, pumps, cleanup tech) that form the "silver buckshot" needed for Utah to clean up its mess and participate in a neighborly fashion developing a Western (then global) water abundance economy.
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